LITIGATION AND SETTLEMENT IN A GAME WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY LECTURE NOTES IN ECONOMICS AND MATHEMATICAL SYSTEMS

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Litigation And Settlement In A Game With Incomplete Information

Author : Wolfgang Ryll
ISBN : 9783642614675
Genre : Business & Economics
File Size : 65.85 MB
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We investigate a two-person game of litigation and settlement with incomplete information on one side. So far, various theoretical attempts have been made to answer the question of why some people choose not to resolve their disputes and instead go to court and incur litigation costs, even if bargaining leaves room for both parties to fare better when avoiding the conflict. We can distinguish between games which focus on strategic elements like games with incomplete information (see, for example, P'ng (1983), Samuelson (1982) and Schweizer (1989» and decision-theoretic models neglecting strategic elements (see, for example, Landes (1971) and Gould (1973». The single-person decision theory approach to litigation assumes litigants to have a subjective estimate of the likelihood that the plaintiff will win the action. Differing views on the probability of winning the court case help to explain the fraction of cases that actually go to trial. Among others, P'ng (1983) points out the shortcomings of the single-person decision theory approach which does not take into account, for example, the different fee systems in England and the U.S. and the differences in information conflicting parties may have. P'ng constructs a model of one-sided incomplete information where the settlement terms are given exogenously. Schweizer (1989), on the other hand, extends P'ng's model and allows for two-sided asymmetric information where the settlement terms are determined endogenously.
Category: Business & Economics

Game Theory And Economic Behaviour

Author : Reinhard Selten (Economist, Germany)
ISBN : 1781008299
Genre :
File Size : 75.80 MB
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'These two volumes constitute an impressive collection of selected path-breaking works of Professor Selten. . . . Edward Elgar Publications deserve merit for bringing out most frequently-cited and prominent articles of Professor Selten in a conveniently available package.' - K. Ravikumar, Journal of Scientific and Industrial Research In 1994, the Nobel Prize was awarded to Reinhard Selten, John Nash and John Harsanyi, for pioneering analysis in game theory. Selten was the first to refine the Nash equilibrium concept of non-cooperative games for analysing dynamic strategic interaction and to apply these concepts to analyses of oligopoly.
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Economics Lab

Author : Alessandra Cassar
ISBN : 9781134347735
Genre : Business & Economics
File Size : 43.93 MB
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This textbook sketches the history of experimental economics before moving on to describe how to set up an economics experiment and to survey selected applications and the latest methods.
Category: Business & Economics

Recent Acquisitions

Author :
ISBN : OSU:32437123161602
Genre : Law libraries
File Size : 29.71 MB
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Category: Law libraries

Innovative Kapitalanlagekonzepte

Author : Elisabeth Hehn
ISBN : 9783322822789
Genre : Business & Economics
File Size : 69.16 MB
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Innovative Anlagekonzepte - eine Notwendigkeit in globalen Finanzmärkten. Hochkarätige Autoren liefern das A (Alternative Investmentstrategien) bis Z (Innovative Zinsprodukte) für Investments.
Category: Business & Economics